Lisa Young: Party State and Political Competition in Canada: The Cartel Model Reconsidered.

**Thesis:** Argues that the cartel party thesis is not supported by empirical evidence in the Canadian case.

**Summary:**

* Seeks to prove that Katz and Mair Cartel Party theory – formation of party cartels in which parties collude to provide themselves with state funding and thereby block the entry of new parties. – does not apply to Canada
* To test the cartel model Young seeks to substantiate four claims:
  + That parties sued their control of the House of Commons to exclude or impede new and smaller parties
  + Parties have used state subsidies in their own self-interest
  + Backlash against the old-line parties
  + Cdn parties are changing their leadership selection procedures in order to free their leaders from effective accountability.
* Even though Cdn parties at the federal level colluded to provide themselves with funding and to hinder the entry of new parties into the system they were not transformed into cartel parties.
* Cdn parties are not primarily reliant on state resources and the formula for public funding do not remove or greatly diminish parties incentives to solicit support from the public and thus ties to the public remain intact.
* Little evidence of diminution of party competition.
* The cartel party acts as an agent of the state, representing the state to society rather than the reverse.
* Many of the candidates do not receive the full value of the reimbursment they are eligible for.
* For the most part, the parties have used their cartel power to lessen the stringency of the rules they set for themselves, not to draw more heavily on the state.
* Challenge to parties from outside interest groups – this isn’t consistent with cartel model.
* Concludes that the cartel model has limited applicability in anglo-american political systems.